OK Motors, Inc. dba Mountain Motors v. Charles P. Hill : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1987
OK Motors, Inc. dba Mountain Motors v. Charles
P. Hill : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael J. Petro, for: Harris & Carter; Attorneys for Appellant.
Harold C. Verhaaren; Mark F. Bell, for: Mazuran, Verhaaren & Hayes, P.C.; Attorneys for
Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, OK Motors, Inc. v. Charles P. Hill, No. 870216 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/457
ur 
DC, 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. 
^ * — O P T THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OK MOTORS, INC. d/b/a 
MOUNTAIN MOTORS 
Plaintiff—Appellant 
vs. 
CHARLES P. HILL 
Defendant—Respondent 
Civil NO. 870216-CA 
Category No. 14b 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
Appeal from Judgment, May 4, 1987 
Eighth Circuit Court, Ut'ah County 
Honorable E. Patrick McGuire, Circuit Judge 
HAROLD C. VERHAAREN and 
MARK F. BELL, for: 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 484-6161 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 
MICHAEL J. PETRO, for: 
HARRIS & CARTER 
3325 N. Univ. Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Sq., Clocktower Bldg 
Provo„ Utah 84604 
(801) 375-9801 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
©fitfj 1 
SEP 23 1987 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OK MOTORS, INC. d/b/a 
MOUNTAIN HOTORS 
Plaintiff—Appellant 
vs. 
CHARLES P. HILL 
Defendant—Respondent 
Civil NO. 870216-CA 
Category No. 14b 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
Appeal from Judgment, May 4, 1987 
Eighth Circuit Court, Utah County 
Honorable E. Patrick McGuire, Circuit Judge 
HAROLD C. VERHAAREN and 
MARK F. BELL, for: 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 SOUth 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 484-6161 
MICHAEL J. PETRO, for: 
HARRIS & CARTER 
3325 N. Univ. Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Sg., Clocktower Bldg 
Provop Utah 84604 
(801) 375-9801 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OK MOTORS, INC. d/b/a 
MOUNTAIN MOTORS 
Plaintiff—Appellant 
vs. 
CHARLES P. HILL 
Defendant—Respondent 
Civil No. 870216-CA 
Category No. 14b 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
Appeal from Judgment, May 4, 1987 
Eighth Circuit Court, Utah County 
Honorable E. Patrick McGuire, Circuit Judge 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3c (Supp. 198$). 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OP PROCEEDINGS 
The plaintiff—appellant, Mountain Rotors, filed a complaint 
against the defendant—respondent, Charles P. Hill, for breach of 
contract, seeking payment for an automobile and other appropriate 
damages (R. 1-2). The defendant's Answer and Counterclaim denied 
that the defendant breached contract and claimed the plaintiff 
breached contract (R. 5-12). Defendant then filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 95-96). 
This appeal is from an order, entered in the Eighth Circuit 
Court on the 4th of May, 1987, granting defendant's motion for 
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summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's complaint (R. 129-
131). Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal as directed by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure on the 3rd of June, 1987 (R. 132-133). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions relevant to the determination of 
the present case are found in the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 
Title 70A of the Utah Code Annotated. Relevant portions of these 
provisions are reproduced verbatim in Addendum "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
It is undisputed that on or about December 17, 1985, 
defendant—respondent, Charles P. Hill went to plaintiff— 
appellant, Mountain Motors, for the purpose of purchasing an 
automobile. On that same day, defendant inspected and test drove 
a used 1981 Volkswagen Rabbit. Two days later, on December 19, 
having inspected the automobile again, defendant bargained-for 
its purchase on an "as is" basis, signed his agreement to such a 
statement (attached as Addendum "B"), and accepted delivery of 
the automobile. In exchange, plaintiff accepted a check for 
$2,642.88 including tax and license (R. 21-23, 75-77, 90-92). 
On December 19, having accepted delivery of the automobile, 
the defendant drove it approximately 50 miles when it developed 
mechanical problems and became inoperable (R. 78-79). Leaving it 
on the shoulder of the road, he called his wife. Mrs. Hill then 
contacted Mountain Motors, informed plaintiff that the vehicle 
was broken down on the freeway, and demanded that they repair it. 
Mountain Motors' secretary, Stacy Dixon, advised Mrs. Hill that, 
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since her boss wasn't in the office, she didn't know exactly what 
could be done, but gave Mrs. Hill three examples of what might be 
done. However, nothing was promised to h|er (R. 25-27, 116-117). 
Subsequently, the defendant stopped payment on his check. 
After payment was stopped, Sarkas Barakat, president of Mountain 
Motors, contacted Mrs. Hill and askec^  that payment be made 
honoring the contract, reminding her that the car was sold "as 
is" and that the defendant had been informed he was responsible 
for any defects even if the car was "brtought back in a basket" 
(R. 22, 25, 117-118). The defendant refused to pay for the car. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This court should rule in favor of tjhe plaintiff—appellant, 
Mountain Motors, and reverse the trial cpurt's decision to grant 
defendant's—respondent's, Mr. Hill's^ motion for summary 
judgment for the following reasons. 
First, defendant purchased on an "as is" basis the 1981 
Volkswagen Rabbit (R. 22-23, 57-58, 60), which effectively 
disclaimed all express and implied warranties under U.C.A. § 70A-
2-316(1-3) (Supp. 1987). Accordingly, the defendant became 
responsible for all mechanical defects i^nd repairs. The Oregon 
Court of Appeals, in Clark v. Ford Motqr Co. , 46 Or. App. 521, 
612 P.2d 564 (1982), ruled in a case directly on point that an 
automobile purchased "as is", "by definition", cannot be non-
conforming. Public policy encourages the freedom to include 
disclaimers of warranties in contracts, Allowing buyer and seller 
the right to determine the allocation o£ each party's risks and 
costs. Defendant accepted the automobile, "as is", after having 
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had the opportunity to inspect and test drive it over a two day 
period (R. 21-23, 75-77). His acceptance served to disallow his 
opportunity to subsequently reject delivery. He received what he 
bargained-for, an automobile which conformed to an "as is" sale. 
Second, revocation of acceptance also cannot be allowed on 
the basis that the automobile conforms to the contract as 
mentioned in the first reason. However, if the automobile was 
found by the trier of fact to be non-conforming, the trial 
court's decision should still be reversed because the defect did 
not substantially impair the value of the car to the defendant, 
given his particular circumstances considered objectively as 
required. It is only reasonable for the defendant to have 
assumed that an "as is" car might develop problems. 
Nevertheless, even if the defect did substantially impair its 
value to him, he has not proven the defect was undiscoverable or 
that he relied on seller's assurances in accepting the car. 
Third, consideration of the automobile is valid under an "as 
is" sale because the automobile is conforming "by definition". 
Consideration is not lacking just because the defendant is not 
satisfied with what he bargained-for. 
Fourth, U.C.A. § 70A-2-316 allows for exclusions or 
disclaimers of warranties, and therefore, they are not 
unconscionable per se. The Utah Supreme Court in Resource 
Management Corp. v. Western Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028 
(Utah 1985) identified various tests that could be used to show 
unconscionability. However, none of those tests were satisfied 
in this case and the principle of the prevention of oppression 
4 
and unfair surprise would not be furthered by allowing an "as is" 
contract to be declared unconscionable. 
Finally, summary judgment should only be granted when it is 
clear from the undisputed facts, viewed in a light most favorable 
to the opposing party, that the opposing party cannot prevail on 
the basis of the applicable law. While the facts are basically 
undisputed in this case, the applicable law, for the reasons 
stated above, favors the plaintiff. Fi^rthermore, in Haucren v. 
Ford Motor Co. . 219 N.W.2d 462, 464 (N.|D. 1974) and Butcher v. 
Garrett-Enumclaw Co. , 20 Wash. App. 36|1, 581 P.2d 1352, 1357 
(1978), the courts ruled that unconscion^bility cannot be decided 
on a motion for summary judgment and that the issue must be 
returned to receive evidence of the commercial setting. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AUTOMOBILE DID CONFORM TO THE C0NTRACT AND THE DELIVERY 
OF THE AUTOMOBILE WAS ACCEPTED. 
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code, in U.C.A. § 70A-2-601 
(1980), provides that a buyer may, air^ ong other alternatives, 
reject goods if they in any way fail to conform to the contract. 
However, in this case, the automobile did conform to the contract 
and the delivery of the automobile was accepted. 
A. The automobile did conform to the "As Is" contract 
which disclaimed all warranties. 
Under U.C.A. § 70A-2-106(2) (19^0), "Goods or conduct 
including any act of a performance are conforming or conform to 
the contract when they are in accordanjce with the obligations 
under the contract." 
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It is undisputed that on December 19, 1985, the defendant, 
Mr. Hill, signed a "buyer's guide", developed by the Federal 
Trade Commission to better establish buyer and seller 
responsibilities, which specified that the 1981 Volkswagen Rabbit 
was being purchased on an "as is", no warranty basis (R. 21-23, 
75-77, 90-92). Accordingly, the plaintiff, Mountain Motors, 
conspicuously disclaimed all express warranties and implied 
warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose as 
permitted under U.C.A. § 70A-2-316(l-3) (Supp. 1987). In 
International Petroleum Services v. A & N Well Service, 230 Kan. 
452, 639 P.2d 29 (1982), the Kansas court ruled, applying a 
statute similar to that adopted by Utah, that implied warranties 
are disclaimed and may not arise in the sale of used goods when 
the goods are sold "as is". See, Yanish v. Fernandez, 156 Colo. 
225, 397 P.2d 881 (1965); Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford, 
681 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1984). 
A case directly on point with the case before this court is 
Clark v. Ford Motor Co., 58 Or. App. 521, 612 P.2d 316 (1980). 
In that case, the Oregon Appellate court found that a used car 
sold "as is" cannot be found to be non-conforming "by definition" 
because the buyer received exactly what he bargained-for. Again, 
in International Petroleum Services, 230 Kan. 452, 639 P.2d at 
30, the court stated that a buyer's knowledge that the goods are 
used, the extent of their use, and whether they are discounted 
may help to determine the standards of quality applied to the 
transaction. With these cases in mind, it follows that a used 
automobile, sold "as is" and disclaiming all implied warranties, 
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should not be found non-conforming, "by definition", since the 
obligations bargained-for don't include any warranties. 
In the dicta of an Illinois Appellate case cited by the 
defendant (R. 103), Blankenship v. Northern Ford, 95 111. App. 3d 
303, 420 N.E.2d 167, 171 (1981), it was assumed as an extension 
of the argument, that contracts with disclaimers would bar 
purchasers from rejecting a car even if it was delivered without 
an engine. However, that court erred in ignoring that a contract 
requires that what is bargained-for is what is delivered. In 
other words, if the car bargained-for and inspected had an 
engine, the car delivered needed to have the same engine for the 
contract to be valid. Such was the situation in this case, in 
which the automobile and engine bargaihed-for and inspected by 
Mr. Hill were the automobile and engine delivered (R. 21-23, 75-
77) . Additionally, it is important to recognize that the 
Illinois Appellate court noted that a buyer and seller still 
needed to have the right to bargain-for each party's risks, and 
that it was in no way attempting to pronibit or dishonor that 
right as the defendant would have the court do in this matter. 
Finally, a case involving a typographical mistake in 
printing business cards where the buyer l>ad inspected a sample of 
the card, where neither party knew of the mistake until after 
delivery, and where there was no mistake as to the identity of 
the good sold and delivered, a mistake as to its character or 
nature was held not to avoid the sale. Giles Lithographic & 
Liberty Printing Co. v. Chase, 149 Mass. 459, 21 N.E. 765 (1889). 
Thus, a mistake relating to the good's quality is not sufficient 
7 
to authorize a court to rescind the contract, where the means of 
information was equally open to both parties. Id. at 766. With 
this in mind, the plaintiff should be no more responsible, 
especially in an "as is" sale, than the future owner Mr. Hill in 
discovering problems with the character of the automobile. See, 
Costello v. Svkes. 143 Minn. 109, 172 N.W. 907, 908 (1919). 
While it is unfortunate that the automobile broke down 
shortly after its purchase, according to the "as is" sale, 
mechanical defects and repairs were not the plaintiff's 
responsibility even if it had to be "brought back in a basket" 
(R. 21-23, 57-58, 60). Comment 7 in U.C.C. § 2-316 further 
explains that in an "as is" sale, the buyer assumes the entire 
risk for any mechanical defects and all necessary repairs. The 
defendant correctly contends that surely the plaintiff would not 
sell a defective and inoperable vehicle (R. 102). The plaintiff 
did not sell a defective and inoperable car, but rather sold a 
used car, which could be expected to experience defects like all 
cars, which conformed to the "as is" sale, and which was 
inspected for safety and operable when it was delivered to and 
accepted by the defendant (R. 21-23, 75-77). 
B. The automobile was bargained-for, purchased, and 
accepted on an "As Is" basis. 
Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer, after a 
reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods, signifies to the 
seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take them in 
spite of their nonconformity. U.C.A. § 70A-2-606(l)(a) (1980). 
Further, pursuant to U.C.A. § 70A-2-513(l) (1980), the buyer has 
the right before payment or acceptance to inspect the goods. 
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The facts are undisputed that Ion December 17, 1985, 
defendant—respondent, Mr. Hill had an opportunity to inspect and 
drive the automobile before payment or acceptance, and he did so 
asking that the wipers and the brakes be checked which they were. 
Then, two days later, he inspected the automobile again and 
decided to make payment and take acceptance. (R. 21-23, 75-77) 
From these facts, it should be concluded that a two day period 
provides a reasonable opportunity, for Wr. Hill, to inspect the 
automobile or even have others inspect i[t for him before payment 
or acceptance. Thus according to § 70A-2-606(l)(a), having had a 
reasonable opportunity to inspect th^ automobile, Mr. Hill 
signified, by making payment, that the automobile was conforming 
or that he would accept it in spite of i^s non-conformity. 
The case before this court factually differs from the cases 
cited by defendant in Zabrieski Chevrolet^ , Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. 
Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968) and ShejLton v. Farkas, 30 Wash. 
App. 549, 635 P.2d 1109 (1981) in that i^ nlike those cases, where 
reasonable opportunity to inspect a new car didn't exist during 
just a "spin around the block" or wher£ a qualified instructor 
wasn't present to inspect the violin £nd the owners wouldn't 
allow it out of the store without purchase, reasonable 
opportunity to inspect or have others inspect for Mr. Hill did 
exist during a two day period (R. 21-2£, 75-77). Furthermore, 
unlike this case, the goods in the casesj cited by defendant were 
not sold on an "as is" basis, and therefore, were subject to 
implied warranties of merchantability anc} fitness for purpose. 
Mr. Hill's actions indicate that \|hen he left plaintiff's 
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car lot with the Rabbit, he had bargained-for, inspected or had 
the opportunity to inspect, made payment, and accepted delivery 
of the Rabbit on an "as is" basis and was responsible for all 
mechanical defects and future repairs. The fact that the 
defendant became unhappy with the car does not indicate he didn't 
receive what he bargained-for, an "as is" car, and that the car 
didn't conform to the contract. 
For the reasons stated in Argument I, showing that the 
defendant, Mr. Hill, accepted delivery of a conforming car when 
he drove it off the lot, summary judgment should be reversed. 
II. REVOCATION OP ACCEPTANCE OP THE AUTOMOBILE SHOULD NOT BE 
ALLOWED BECAUSE THE AUTOMOBILE DID CONFORM TO THE CONTRACT. 
In finding that defendant—respondent, Mr. Hill, accepted 
delivery of the automobile, thereby precluding its rejection, 
U.C.A § 70A-2-608(l) (b) (1980) allows for a buyer to revoke his 
acceptance of non-conforming goods whose non-conformity 
substantially impairs its value to him if his acceptance was 
induced by either 1) the difficulty of discovering the non-
conformity before acceptance or 2) by the seller's assurances. 
The first requirement under U.C.A. § 70A-2-608(1)(b) is that 
the goods be found to be non-conforming. The argument and the 
facts set forth above establish that the automobile bargained-
for, purchased, and accepted by Mr. Hill conformed to the "as is" 
contract that was signed by him. Given that failure to show non-
conformity prohibits a revocation of an acceptance, this court 
should rule that Mr. Hill cannot revoke the contract. 
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A. The automobile's value was not substantially impaired. 
However, if the court finds that the automobile was accepted 
and that it did not conform to the contract, the burden of proof 
is on the buyer to show whether the non-conformity substantially 
impaired the car's value to him. Whether goods are substantially 
impaired is a question to be decided by the trier of fact. 
Aubrey's R.V. Center v. Tandy Corp., 46 Wash. App. 595, 731 P.2d 
1124, 1128 (1987) (citing Havs Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 78 
Wash. 2d 343, 347, 474 P.2d 270 (1970)); McGilbrav v. Scholfield 
Winnebago, Inc., 221 Kan. 605, 561 P.2d 8|32 (1977). 
In analyzing if the alleged impairment of value was 
substantial to the defendant, contrary to defendant's position, 
the necessary test involves the use of ai} objective standard with 
reference to the buyer's particular circumstances, rather than 
his unarticulated subjective desires. foibrey's R.V. Center, 4 6 
Wash. App. 595, 731 P.2d at 1128. See, McGilbray, 221 Kan. 605, 
561 P.2d at 836. Again, the court in International Petroleum 
Services, 230 Kan. 452, 639 P. 2d at 30;, stated that a buyer's 
knowledge that the goods are used, the Extent of their use, and 
whether they are discounted may help to determine what standards 
of quality applied to the transaction. Certainly, an objective 
test of Mr. Hill's particular circumstances would indicate that 
the purchase of an "as is" automobile should reasonably be 
expected to require mechanical repair?, notwithstanding when 
those repairs became necessary. 
Also objectively considering Mr. Hill's particular 
circumstances, including his need for transportation, since the 
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defendant did not present any factual information stating that 
the automobile could not be repaired, it can be assumed that like 
most cars, it could have been repaired. Therefore, 
transportation could have still been provided, without 
substantial or lasting impairment, if Mr. Hill had fulfilled his 
responsibility to repair the automobile. 
B. The mechanical defect has not been shown to have been 
undiscoverable before acceptance.* 
If the court did find the automobile non-conforming and that 
its non-conformity had substantially impaired its value to the 
defendant, it is still necessary for the defendant to show that 
his acceptance was either induced because 1) the defect could not 
have been discovered before acceptance or 2) because of the 
seller's assurances. While it is undisputed that Mr. Hill took 
delivery of the car without knowledge of any mechanical defect 
(R. 77-78), all that is mentioned by the defendant concerning the 
car's mechanical defect is that the problem involved the drive 
mechanism (R. 79). Certainly, the defendant, claiming that a 
defect was undiscoverable before acceptance, should be required 
to submit proof for such a claim including an exact determination 
of the defect and why it was undiscoverable. 
Furthermore, a mistake as to the nature or condition of a 
car conforming to contract, as outlined in Argument I-A, does not 
allow a contract to be voidable because of difficulty in 
discovering a defect where both parties were in an equally good 
position to know of the defect. Giles Lithographic, 149 Mass. at 
459, 21 N.E. at 765. This is especially persuasive in this "as 
is" sale case. Mr. Hill, being able to inspect and drive the car 
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as much as desired for two days (R. 21-23, 75-77), had as good a 
chance to discover the defect as the plaintiff did, especially 
since the plaintiff had also received the car from someone else 
(R. 24), and therefore, could not know oti all possible defects. 
Also, public policy would encourage that sellers not be 
required to know all the potential or existing problems with used 
"as is" merchandise. The costs for imposing this guarantee of 
quality would be severe and would serve to limit the contractual 
freedom of dividing the risks and costs between the buyers and 
sellers. The plaintiff should not be responsible for all 
possible undiscoverable defects in this ^as is" sale. 
Finally, defendant has not proven that the plaintiff made 
assurances about the car's quality that lead to the defendant's 
acceptance. However, the fact that the plaintiff instructed the 
defendant that the automobile was being gold "as is", and that he 
would be responsible for the car even if it were "brought back in 
a basket" (R. 21-23), indicates that th£ plaintiff did not make 
any assurances of quality which could have been relied upon. 
Also, the defendant signed both the contract and buyer's guide 
which conspicuously stated that the dealor took no responsibility 
for any repairs in spite of any oral statements (R. 57-58, 60). 
For the reasons stated in Argument II, summary judgment 
should be reversed on finding that the automobile was conforming, 
the automobile's value to the defendant was not substantially 
impaired by the defect, and that the defendant's acceptance was 
not induced by either the undiscoverability of the defect or by 
seller's assurances. 
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III. THE AUTOMOBILE WAS CONSIDERATION FOR THE PAYMENT AND THE 
CONTRACT IS THEREFORE NOT VOIDABLE. 
In a case directly on point to the present case, the court 
in Yanish. 156 Colo. 225, 397 P. 2d at 882 was faced with a 
complaint involving failure of consideration for an automobile, 
sold "as is", that was entirely unworkable due to mechanical 
defects. The court ruled that there were no implied warranties, 
in spite of any representations by the seller to the contrary, 
and the complaint was dismissed because consideration did exist. 
The situation is very similar in the case before this court. 
No implied warranties were given because the automobile was sold 
"as is", and Mr. Hill received what he bargained-for, an "as is" 
car, thereby having received consideration for his payment. In 
concluding that consideration was received by Mr. Hill, summary 
judgment should be reversed. 
IV. THE EXCLUSION OR DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES IN AN "AS IS" SALE 
IS NOT UNCONSCIONABLE. 
U.C.A. § 70A-2-316(l-3) (Supp. 1987), provides that both 
express and implied warranties may be disclaimed in a contract up 
to the point that they are found unconscionable under U.C.A. § 
70A-2-302 (1980). In Resource Management Corp. v. Western Ranch 
& Livestock Co. , 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme 
Court applied U.C.A. § 70A-2-302 to a non-U.C.C. case and 
identified the principle for allowing unconscionability and the 
various standards in which to test for unconscionability. 
The principal or purpose of unconscionability is one of 
preventing oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance 
of the allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power. 
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mentioned was a test used in Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 
275 P.2d 989 (1958), which asks whether the contract is one that 
no "decent, fair-minded person" would view without being 
possessed of a profound sense of injustice. And yet another test 
used in Bekins, 664 P.2d at 462, requires that an unconscionable 
contract show an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights 
of the parties. Procedurally, tests of unconscionability 
mentioned in Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1042, include a 
take it or leave it basis, an absence of meaningful choice or a 
lack of opportunity for meaningful negotiation. These procedural 
tests are then considered in light of inequalities in the 
bargaining power, incomprehensible contractual language, or a 
general lack of sophistication of the party. Id. 
In regards to the substantive tests outlined in Resource 
Management, it follows that the "as is" contract bargained-for in 
this case was not oppressive and didn't present unfair surprise. 
Mr. Hill had two days to bargain-for, inspect, and accept the 
automobile (R. 21-23, 75-77), and should not have been surprised 
by an "as is" sales contract disclaiming all warranties. The 
buyer's guide, indicating an "as is" sale, was developed by the 
FTC and is adopted and used by car dealerships to better 
establish buyer and seller responsibilities. Public policy 
argues that its use is essential to the commercial setting and 
needs of the trade as explained in argument II-B. Reaching the 
same conclusion in Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson. Inc. , 130 
Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210, 211 (1981), the court ruled a contract 
was not unconscionable when a buyer would have had to purchase 
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Summary judgment should be reversed in this case because the 
"as is" contract should not be ruled unconscionable using any of 
the various tests provided for by the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Also, the right to disclaim warranties is allowed under U.C.A. § 
70A-2-316(l-3) and is fundamental to the commercial setting and 
needs of car sells, and therefore, should not be unconscionable. 
V. A CONTRACT CANNOT BE PROPERLY FOUND UNCONSCIONABLE ON A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Utah courts have ruled that summary judgment should only be 
granted when it is clear from the undisputed facts, viewed in a 
light most favorable to the opposing party, that the opposing 
party cannot prevail, Conder v. Williams, 61 Adv. Report 23 (Utah 
Ct. App. 6/25/87), based on the applicable law. Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Devel. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1985). 
While the facts are basically undisputed in this case, the 
applicable law, based on the arguments stated above, favors the 
plaintiff, and therefore, summary judgment should be reversed. 
Furthermore, U.C.A. § 70A-2-302 (1980) provides for the 
determination of unconscionability as a matter of law in light of 
the commercial setting and contractual provisions of the case. 
The Code requires that a reasonable opportunity be afforded to 
present such evidence to the court in making its determination. 
As a result, it is improper for a court to decide an issue of 
unconscionability on a motion for summary judgment without having 
received evidence from the parties during trial. Haugen v. Ford 
Motor Co. . 219 N.W.2d 462, 464 (N.D. 1974); Butcher v. Garrett-
Enumclaw Co., 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352, 1357 (1978). 
18 
CONCLUSION 
T h e t r i a l i m in i I "a q r a nt i n q o 1 i I i f e n d a n t # s - - r e sponden t' s 
mo L i o n l m Minimal I | i i i l i | im lull I n i u l i l In IIIIMI" N M HI l u i 1 II in II 11 II II i n i i ill | 
r e a s o n s ' i r s t i ' I molnh oritoniied in 11 i i s " 
c o n t r a c t r lhy i ln l m in m 1 ini i i" n x c l u d i n r j i l l w i r r "int i p * a1 in II 1 owed 
u n d i M i III i h 11 a A - A J II I I  II I I  mi in i II I  I n i J i . 1 1 t s i ' t l in mi in I Hi mi 11 in mi in i i II I i n 
i n s p e c t e d h i m s e l f o r had t h e |i| i i u n i t y t o have o t h e r s i n s p e c t , 
e I I I I'M! I Vnlkswaqen Rabbit Nnvt , the 
d e f e n d a n t d id n o t show t h a t 1 tie d e t e c t s u b s t a n t i a 1J y i mipa 11 ed t he 
c a r ' 4 ? va* ie t o him and I h ill I he a c c e p t a n c e was induced by o i t h e r 
\ - i i | « i i ii i i) i mi mi n mi ! in mi ( mi 1 i I i 1 1 1 11 i r 
q u a l i t y . A l s o Mi h ' t i i i s a c c e p t e d iiiiiii I In "as is1 1 c a j » u n t r a c t 
e^ I In IIHIIHOI IIIIIII wh 11 Ii I I in mi 11 in I l a r g a i n e d - f o i d n o s n o t 
: a l l i I I i I I III mi i i m i i l mi in I - s 
o u t l i n e d \\\ t h e Utah Supreme c o u r t - i n a l i y , uncons : l o n a c m t y 
s h o u l d not bo rn 1 od upon i n summar" ^ - i ^ , ^ . . vpr . i i f * -ho 
r e a s o n s i d e n t i l it ill I he court* «= : . j 
a u t o m o b i l e was „ ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o r t h e contra*** che 
c :: lit* i an 1 .Ii II I i I I n i in I n r c e d i :i :: t r n ill = ::i i  in: i :::: :::)! i sc i :: i lat 11 e 
The p l a i n t i f f , Mountai i i Motoi :  s , r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t s t h a t 
t h i s Court r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t and deny d e f e n d a n t ' s mot ion 
i c in II ' " i mi in 11 in I » 4 n i « ' • i in t . __. r—r-
R e s p e c t i v e l y s u b m i t t e d t h i s _ ;; i a v ~f Atrgbst * , r k°7. 
H a r r i s and c a r t e r 
Michae l J* P e t r o 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f — ' r r e x i a m 
x^ 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Appellate Brief was mailed to the following, postage 
prepaid the ^ £ '^day of Auguafc* 1987. 
HAROLD C. VERHAAREN and 
MARK F. BELL, for: 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 484-6161 
20 
ADDENDUM 
*>1 
ADDENDUM "A* 
"All III" MALUM CONTRACT 
BUYERS GUIDu 
IMPORTANT: Spokan promiaat ara difficult to anforca. Aak tha daalar to put all promiaaa In writing. Kaap this 
.
 f r f ^ 
\ \U.*r\ DL m 
iU 
U / I 
W M C U HAM I 
I IITOCi iMNMKff (Op*f«gll 
WARRANTIES FOR THIS VEHICLE: 
AS IS NO WARRANTY 
YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. Tha daalar aaaumat no responsibility for any repair* . 
of any oral ttatamants about tha vehicle 
ARRANTY 
O FULL O LIMITED WARRANTY. Tha daalar will pay he labor ai % of tha pai ti foi 
tha covarad ayatama that fail during tha warranty period. Aak tha daalar for a copy of tha warranty 
documant for a full axplanation of warranty covaraga, exclusions, and tha dealer's rapair obligations. 
Undar state law, "Implied warranties" may give you even mora rights. 
SYSTEMS COVERED: DURATION: 
p3 SERVICE CONTRACT. A service contract la available at an extra charge on this vehicle. Aak for details aa to 
covaraga, deductible, price, and exclusions. If you buy a service contract within 90 daya of tha time of sale, state 
law "implied warranties" may grva you additional righta. 
PRE PURCHASE INSPECTION: ASK THE DEALER IF YOU MAY HAVE THIS VEHICLE INSPECTED' ill I i: Il Il Il 
MECHANIC EITHER ON OR OFF THE LOT. 
SEE THE BACK OF THIS FORM for Important additional information, including a Mat of aoma major dafacta that 
may occur In used motor vahietaa. 
Below »? a list of some majoi^Jfects that may occur In u»ed mote chicles. 
F/ame & Boc'* 
Ff&- t cc : ks co-'fecVv« ^e 'd i c *usted ttvc^g-
C••« !t3K2pe excud -g r c r . a a* - pace 
Crack-::? L : ; I > or head 
Be'rs ^ ss.-.j ; - .noperas*? 
K--o.?.: £•• r r i i i rfia'eJ tc c a - * ^ ^ :.?:<.-> a'C 
p~?k fCGS 
Ati^o'-ra-exhajs; d.scna'S6-
Trar.srr.iss or & Drne Shaft 
! ~ ^_ce ' ' j ' d t . c ' o ' i e a i i g e . e ^ v d ^ - r ^ j see; a:/. 
C*c\ ».c- or d ^ e ^ : w3se * " ' ; ' ' .-£ v:s P<_-
At"?"~~?' n* ;?e ?* v»bra?5o'' C2'j??f try ?a,j,ty v~rM?,~,?*>,?r 
C C V€ S^Sf 
Manuai clutch £ ps c charters 
Differential 
frr; 'Cfe* f - cf ?e.-e' cr !ea*>ag? e-'c'j:?"-; r c r ; see^ige 
Coottn<j System 
Jr..;,: j p e \ . lor.cLo.i.r.y *a'.c, pwrv.p 
Electrics! Systs-n 
E.^ e . ;ea..i-;€-
I n v e r t , ?--:-:o'=-s i*: 3erc-2Vj tr^e'v estate 
Fue! System 
Vis.ti'e <ea>.3Cfc 
Inoperable Accessories 
Gauges or warn.ng de..ces 
Air condittone^ 
Heater & Defroster 
. BraVe System 
Pest r,ct f :rr. wrce- 3'essw?e jDCT spec. 
N«^ e".c-3u pesa' rese-v~ r?C* spec ' 
Dees HI.4 stct /eK ; e ;-. s t ra^" ' ' - i t C C T sc : . 
D ^ r o' ro'o- too tr- «\ »/*g- Specs. 
L i - ' " . ; r- ps- •»» cK-ess 'F-T r*s- •? '22 :**r" 
Fo*e „-. • - j t opt - - * - . ; :- ea> - ; 
S 'uc t j a .v meca- fca pa1"!; oa~cQcJ 
Steering System 
Tc: - j r '.-€-• c ' : , ©' s ,£-f - : « ' £ - -.?C~ s r - : = 
F'ee p'i> •' ; -KuCic f r e e mar". «inch 
£ • - - - •5 ^ v t " C s o ' j a ~ s 
Pc-Ae- „n • reft.-. ;rac"frc: c- s:-pp ~J 
rcvi-f-- / : ' : d ;e»r! ~ > : p e ' 
Suspension 
Be l jo ; t5 '-3 :8d?~'aaed 
St r jc t - 'a '&s t : rents'-dc.-.-sgei 
StaL \ :e ta-a.ic^rne:te-j 
S^-•.^ aL-scroer rrou°i-r.g 'ciac 
S^ iC<«^  3wji'iC <c«»*\..'.C; c: !«r.c5.or.,r.^  i.T.p<'cpc'>y 
T/res 
Trfad.oe^!!-less tr.aa 2/32 'icfi 
Sizes i r i s ^ a t c e d 
\/»» Die aarr.age 
WheeU 
•\/'S--t-e cracKs. damage or res3 -s 
f/c j - * -.c tC'tts '.cose 0' rr.'ss -5 
Exhaust System 
Leanage 
SCE FOR COMPLAINTS 
I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS BUYERS GUIDE. 
x 'OA*X pj f l ,- /^i^^r 
CUSTOMER SIGNATURE DATE 
IMPORTANT: The information on this form is part of any contract to buy this vehicle. Removal of this label before 
consumer purchase (except for purpose of test-driving) Is a violation of federal law (16.C.F.R. 455). 
sjujMO coec iT»e-ei-c 
A-2 
A D D E N D U M »B» 
S T A T U T O R Y II Ml IOV I li 11 HIM (illllil II I l l l ft IN! Ill11 III I III iP Il I M I I I 
I | I ' 1111 in I lief i mi 1 lions • - "Co^formi ng" to Centrist 
Goods or conduct including any part of a performance 
are "conforming" or conform to the contract when they 
are in accordance with th = obligations under the 
contract. 
§ 70A-2-302 (1980): Unconscionable contract or clause. 
ml in If the cour t as a matt-:: = « ' : f'ra ** * 
any clause of the contract to have Deen ancor ;:ionr 
at the time it was made the court may reiuse t , erf:, 
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder :„! z.% 
contract without the unconscionable clause, ^r it may 
so limit the application of any uncons. 4~^ K ^ ^ J S ^ 
as to avoid any unconscionable result, 
(2) when it is :: Il = i m = :i :: r appears luu : *.- • ^  i -
contract or ai i;; :: .] ai use thereof may be uncoi - o i 
the parties sha ] Il be afforded a reasonable of ortunity 
to present evidence as to its commercial setting, 
purpose and effect to a :i d the court in making the 
determinat ion. 
, A - 2 - 3 : L X _ _,
 x__jrir. ): Exclusion modification of 
warranties, 
(1) Words or ,:c ndact. relevant * ':,-•:• riti... of an exp; 
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or 
limit warranty sha1. be construed wherever reasonab-" 
as consistent with ea,.h other; but subject to 
provisions of this chapter on parol or extrinsic 
evidence (section 70A-2-202) negation or limitation is 
inoperative to the extent that such construction is 
unreasonable. 
f "») Subject "". subsection ( exclude or modii . 
implied warranty of mercl • ; ity or any part of 
the language must mention merchantability and in t-.t 
case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude 
or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion 
must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to 
exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient 
i £ it states, for example, that "There are no 
warranties which extend beyond the description oi I the 
face hereof." 
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all 
implied warranties are excluded by expressions 
like "as is", "with faults" or other language 
which in common understanding calls the buyer's 
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes 
plain that there is no implied warranty; and 
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract 
has examined the goods or the sample or model as 
fully as he desired or has refused to examine the 
goods there is no implied warranty with regard to 
defects which an examination ought in the 
circumstances to have revealed to him; and 
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or 
modified by course of dealing or course of 
performance or usage of trade, 
70A-2-513(l) (1980): Buyer's right to inspection of goods. 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed and subject to subsection (3), 
where goods are tendered or delivered or identified to 
the contract for sale, the buyer has a right before 
payment or acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable 
place and time and in any reasonable manner. When the 
seller is required or authorized to send the goods to 
the buyer, the inspection many be after their arrival. 
70A-2-601 (1980): Buyer's rights on improper delivery. 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter on breach in 
installment contracts (§ 70A-2-612) and unless otherwise 
agreed under the sections on contractual limitations of 
remedy (§ 70A-2-718 and § 70A-2-719) , if the goods or the 
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the 
contract, the buyer may (a) reject the whole; or (b) accept 
the whole; or (c) accept any commercial unit or units and 
reject the rest. 
70A-2-606(l)(a) (1980): What constitutes acceptance of goods. 
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer 
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the 
goods signifies to the seller that the goods are 
conforming or the he will take or retain them in 
spite of their nonconformity; or 
B-2 
§ 70A-2-608 (1 ) (1 : ) (1980) : Revocation c i : acceptance 1 il 1 ile or 
i n part , 
(::i ) The bu ' ceptance o r 2 c: " or 
commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially 
impairs its value to him if he hgs accepted it 
i without discovery of such nonconformity if his 
acceptance was reasonably induced either by the 
difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by 
the seller's assurances. 
